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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to §78A-3~i02(3)(a), 
UTAH CODE ANN. This Court granted the Petition for Certiorari on May 13, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Res judicata: Whether the claim asserted in the Complaint was 
barred by res judicata. 
Standard of Review: 
When exercising our certiorari jurisdiction, 'we review 
the decision of the court of appeals, not of the trial 
court/ The court of appeals' determination of whether 
res judicata bars an action presents a question of law. 
'When reviewing questions of law, we accord no 
particular deference to the conclusions of law made by 
the court of appeals but review them for correctness/ 
Macris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214, 
1218 (Utah 2000). 
The decision of the Court of Appeals, on whether the Complaint was barred by 
res judicata, was divided and this Court should make the law clear for future 
litigants. 
2. Rule 11 Sanctions: Did the Complaint in the underlying action 
violate Rule 11(b)(2), warranting sanctions. 
1 
Standard of Review: "[T]he standard of review for evaluating ... rule 11 
sanctions involves a three-tiered approach: 'l) findings of fact are reviewed 
under a clearly erroneous standard; 2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the 
correction of error standard; and 3) the type and amount of sanction to be 
imposed is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard/" Morse v. Packer 
i5P.3d 1021,1025 (Utah 2000) (citing Barnard v. Sutlijf, 846 P.2d 1229,1234 
(Utah 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the case: This appeal is from a decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, Gillmor v. Family Link, LLC, et a/., 224 P.3d 741, 749 (Utah CtApp. 
2010), regarding res judicata and Rule 11(b)(2) sanctions. (Gillmor at Kill, 8,10, 
15-21, 28.) The Court of Appeals heard appeals from two final Orders issued by 
the Honorable Judge Robert K. Hilder, in the Third Judicial District Court for 
Summit County, Utah. One order granted a motion to dismiss (R. 154-156) by 
Defendants/Appellees (collectively "Family Link") and the other granted a 
motion for Rule 11 sanctions. (R. 195-205.) 
The underlying case concerns a dispute over access to a very large parcel of 
land (a few thousand acres) that is essentially landlocked. (R. 2 and 197; see also 
Gillmor at H3.) As a result of a prior interpretation of a settlement agreement 
between some persons related to the parties in this action, the parcel of property 
2 
is accessible only to Gillmor personally (and a few others)1, and then only for very 
limited purposes, including animal husbandry and hunting. Gillmor v. Macey, 
2005 UT App 351,121 P.3d 57; see also Gillmor at H3. The road to the Gillmor 
property, however, has been in use by the public as a thoroughfare continuously 
for at least ten years (and actually closer to 100 years) for numerous purposes. 
(R. 110, p. 241. 23 - p. 251. 21.) 
b. Course of the proceedings: In this matter, Gillmor filed a Complaint 
seeking private condemnation and/or "highway-by-use" over Family Links' lands. 
(R. 1-7.) Family Link filed Motions to Dismiss the Complaint, arguing judicial 
estoppel and res judicata. (R. 22) Gillmor opposed the Motions to Dismiss, 
arguing that her Complaint contained new claims, involved parties not included 
in the previous actions, and on other grounds. (R. 70-77.) Family Link was also 
granted Rule 11 Sanctions. (R. 111-112.) 
c. Disposition at trial court: The District Court granted the Motion to 
Dismiss only on the grounds of res judicata. (R. 109.)2 Following the Order 
1 Gillmor's children from a prior marriage are ineligible to inherit the rights of 
use because the lawyer for Frank Gillmor, an old sheepherder at the time, used 
the word "consanguinity" in the Settlement Agreement to describe future rights. 
2 Gillmor chose not to seek Rule 11 sanctions for Family Link's attempt to dismiss 
based on judicial estoppel, even though the law on that point was crystal clear 
3 
Granting the Motion to Dismiss (R. 154-156), Family Link was also granted Rule 
11(b)(2) sanctions. (R. 195-205.) 
d. Disposition in the Utah Court of Appeals: The Utah Court of Appeals, in 
a split decision, upheld both orders by the District Court. (Gillmor at HH14,18 
and 19.) The dissent, however, argued that res judicata did not apply and, 
therefore, that Rule 11 sanctions could not have been awarded. (Gillmor at HH25-
28.) The majority decision of the Court of Appeals did not address how Rule 11 
sanctions could be warranted given that the position of Gillmor's counsel - that 
Gillmor's Complaint was not barred by res judicata - was supported by a Judge 
of the Court of Appeals. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
Gillmor owns a very large tract of property that is effectively landlocked as 
a result of topography and a prior court ruling. See, Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT 
App 351,121 P.3d 57; see also R. 2 and 197; see also Gillmor at H3). Family Link 
owns lands that stand between Gillmor's property and the most convenient 
presently declared public road. (R. 3; see also Gillmor at Uf 2 and 3.) Family Link 
has been unwilling to allow Gillmor to have reasonable access to her property. 
(R. 5, see also Gillmor at U4.) Gillmor brought this action to obtain reasonable 
access to her property under two legal theories - "highway-by-use" (R. 5; see also 
and Family Link had no legitimate basis for making the claim - as the District 
Court found. (R. 229, p. 2611. 4-13). 
A 
Gillmor at HK4 and 24-27) (Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104 (2001)) and condemnation 
(R. 4 and R. 229, p. 291. 20 - p. 301. 7; see also Gillmor at HH4 and 24-27). This 
action was the first time that suit was brought that included as defendants all of 
the property owners who block access from Gillmor's property to a road and this 
Complaint was the first time that these two specific claims have been raised. (R. 
1-7; see also Gillmor at UH24-27.) 
In 1984 Gillmor's now-deceased husband, Frank Gillmor, brought an 
action against only the largest landowner between Mr. Gillmor's property and the 
main Weber Canyon Road, David K. Richards. (R. 31, Exhibit No. 2 and R. 110, p. 
2911. 20-23; see also Gillmor at H2.) In that action Mr. Gillmor sought access to 
his property either by a prescriptive easement or by an irrevocable license across 
Mr. Richards' property. (Id.) That action ended over 20 years ago with a 
settlement agreement between Mr. Richards and Mr. Gillmor providing for some 
access to the Gillmor property across Mr. Richards' property. (Id.) As a 
settlement, preclusion does not attach to the 1984 action or its resolution. 
In 2001, Ms. Gillmor brought suit against Mr. Richards to determine and 
enforce the terms of the 1984 settlement agreement so that she and others could 
continue to access the Gillmor property. (R. 31, Exhibit No. 1; see also Gillmor at 
U3.) The 2001 action ended when the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted the 
settlement agreement and left Gillmor's property essentially landlocked, limiting 
access just to Mrs. Gillmor and a limited few others, and for very limited 
purposes. (Id.) The Court of Appeals, interpreting the 1984 settlement 
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agreement, specifically found that the easement created in the agreement did not 
run with the land and would not inure to a future landowner, or even to Gillmor's 
children who were non-consanguinous to Frank Gillmor. Gillmor v. Macey, 
2005 UT App 351, UH19 and 23,121 P.3d 57; see also Gillmor at I3. 
This action does not arise from the 1984 settlement agreement, or from the 
2001 lawsuit to interpret and enforce the settlement agreement. Instead, the 
issues in this case arise from and concern Gillmor's statutory rights. (R. 1-7; see 
also Gillmor at 1^24-27.) Importantly, following resolution of the 2001 case, 
"highway-by-use" law in Utah changed significantly. 
This case is completely unlike the prior lawsuits. Gillmor does not here 
seek a private easement over anyone else's property or any legal redress based on 
the settlement agreement in her husband's 1984 case. Instead she brought new 
statutory claims independent of the 1984 settlement agreement. (R. 1-7 and R. 
229, p. 311. 4-6; see also Gillmor at 1f1f4 and 24-27.) Moreover, this action is 
brought against all the landowners who block her property from declared public 
roads, not just Mr. Richards and his successors-in-interest. (R. 1-7). 
Family Link filed Motions to Dismiss under two theories, judicial estoppel 
and res judicata. (R. 22; see also Gillmor at U4). The District Court rejected the 
judicial estoppel argument but granted the Motion on the grounds of res 
judicata. (R. 109; see also Gillmor at U7.) Thereafter, Family Link filed a Motion 
for Rule 11 Sanctions that the District Court granted. (R. 195-205; see also 
Gillmor at 118.) 
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This case involves new parties and different claims than those previously 
decided. (R. 1-7.) It is not barred by res judicata and sanctions should not have 
been granted. Even if res judicata applied, sanctions are improper and 
unwarranted because counsel had a reasonable basis for filing the Complaint, as 
shown by, among other things, the fact that a Judge of the Court of Appeals also 
believed that res judicata did not bar the Complaint. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Gillmor's Complaint was not barred by res judicata. The claims asserted in 
the Complaint had not been brought in any prior action, depended on facts which 
were not at issue in any prior action, involved statutory arguments completely 
distinct from and independent of the claims in previous actions, and was the first 
case to involve all of the landowners that block Gillmor's property access. (R. 1-
7.) Rule 11 sanctions were not appropriate in this case because Gillmor's counsel 
filed the Complaint after researching the facts and the law and determining that 
Gillmor's claims were warranted under existing law or at least were not contrary 
to any existing Utah authority. Moreover, that a reasonable lawyer could advance 
the claims is proven by the fact that one member of the Court of Appeals agreed 
that Gillmor's claims were not barred by res judicata. 
ARGUMENT 
L A. Res Judicata does not bar Gillmor's Complaint. 
Res judicata does not apply in this case for, inter alia, the reasons clearly 
and correctly articulated by Judge Thorne in his dissent below: 
7 
The suits initiated in 1984 and 2001 were private 
claims, the first for a prescriptive easement or 
irrevocable license and the second for a declaration of 
rights under the easement agreement negotiated in the 
previous case. These private claims are different than 
and may be pursued separately from the public interest 
claim under Utah Code Section 72-5-104 (the 
Dedication Statute) as initiated in the present suit. See 
Utah Code Ann. §72-5-104 (2009). 
Although the public interest claim could have 
been presented in either the 1984 or 2001 suit, I do not 
believe that it should necessarily have been raised in the 
previous actions for several reasons. First, neither Mr. 
Gillmor in his IQ84 action nor Mrs. Gillmor in her 2001 
action were obligated to bring a public claim - seeking a 
right for the members of the public to use the Richards 
property - in their pursuit of a determination of their 
own private right to use of the property. Indeed, the 
Gillmors' decision not to pursue a public claim under 
the Dedication Statute ought not preclude any member 
of the general public from initiating such a suit at a later 
time. The objective of claim preclusion is 'that a 
8 
controversy should be adjudicated only once/ see Mack 
v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 4-. II29, 635 
Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (internal quotation mark: 'tilled) 
rI 'his, ho w e < • ei , Is no I: feasible in the present case where 
members of the public may still pursue a public claim 
regardless of prior private right litigation. 
Applica tion :)f clain 1 pi ech lsioi 1 in this 1 na titer 
would lead to an illogical result. A literal application of 
claim preclusion in the present case would have the 
effect of preventing all members o» _u^ _
 4^A;Jfv ^wni 
bringing a ptiblic claim based on the res judicata ruling 
barring the Gillmors from pursuing such a public claim. 
Even it claim preclusion win1 applied oiih h I he 
Gillmors, the majority's decision todaj would be 
illogical in that J" would prevent the Gillmors from 
pursuing a claim which any other membei <>l llie public 
1 i ligh t bring seeking the declaration of a public right in 
this piece of property. Instead of ending a dispute about 
the rights pertaining to a parcel the majority decision 
simply delays the resolution for another day. 
Second, the private claims asserted in the IQ84 
and 2001 actions are inherently different and require 
9 
the presence of different factual determinations than the 
present public claim under the Dedication Statute 
Gillmor at IU24-27 (emphasis added). 
The 1984 action asserted a claim for prescriptive 
easement. To establish a prescriptive easement, a 
claimant 'must establish a use that is open, notorious, 
adverse, and continuous for at least twenty years.' 
Edgell v. Canning, 1999 UT 21, 18, 976 P.2d 1193. The 
2001 action sought a declaration of rights under the 
easement agreement negotiated in the previous case. 
Neither of these two causes of action require, as does the 
present claim, proof that the property has been 
continuously used by the public as a public 
thoroughfare. See Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding 
Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, U10, 208 P.3d 1077, cert, 
denied, 215 P.3d 161 (Utah 2009). 'To satisfy the public 
thoroughfare element, [pjlaintiffs must demonstrate 
proof of (i) passing or travel, (ii) by the public, and (iii) 
without permission.' Id. f 11. 
Gillmor at n. 7 (emphasis in original). 
Just because the claims are for access does not mean the claims are so 
interrelated to those brought in previous suits that res judicata automatically or 
10 
nm^sni il\ applies. ,SVc Schuvv n. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983) andSearle 
Bros. v. Searle, 558 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). Courts did not find res judicata 
applicable in Schaer or Searle, even though all of the ac tions wei e aboi it access 
anil UP,, ohed tin1 same parlic!!, • • • 
Gillmor's case is surprisingly similar to the facts in Schaer v. State, 657 
P.2d 1337,1340 (Utah 1983). Schaer also involved multiple lawsuits and 
property access In .SWitiri Ilia Nhile (if* 1 Itah condemned ( (» aires of Schaer's 
22.8 acre property to build a highway in 1967. Schaer asked for and received 
severance damages because the condemnation landlocked the remainder o; 11 > s 
property .: . . : . ; - ' • - •* • > • « . : «,-. ^ . n , 
w 'ill 1 1 xi across 
More than a decade later Schaer instituted another suit seeking an access 
road to the remainder of the proper! \ so lie could develop it (or residential use. 
Tins Court found dial / es judicata did not bar his second case: 
. . .because it is based on a different claim, demand or 
cause of action than that of the i 967 litigation Thejwo 
causes of action rest 00 a different state of facts and 
evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to 
sustain the two causes of action. Moreover, I he 
evidence of I he I wo causes of arliori relates to the status 
of the property in two completely different and separate 
time periods. 
11 
Id. (emphasis added). 
This case too is based on a different state of facts than the prior action, 
involves evidence of a different kind than was or would have been necessary in 
either of the previous lawsuits, and is grounded in distinct legal theories. The 
2001 case sought to interpret and enforce a private party contract. The instant 
case seeks to apply statutory rights that are either public or quasi-public. 
Consequently, Gilmore's claims, as in Schaer, are not barred by res 
judicata since either a declaration of condemnation (R. 229, p. 2911. 21-24) or 
"highway-by-use" (R. 229, p. 2311.13-18) to access the property require a 
different state of facts and evidence then interpreting a private settlement 
agreement between two parties. 
TWIhere the second cause of action between the same 
parties is upon a different cause or demand, the 
principle of res judicata is applied much more narrowly. 
In this situation, the judgment in the prior action 
operates as an estoppel, not as to matters which might 
have been litigated and determined, but 'only as to those 
matters in issue or points controverted, upon the 
determination of which the finding or verdict was 
rendered/ Since the cause of action involved in the 
second proceeding is not swallowed by the judgment in 
the prior suit, the parties are free to litigate points which 
12 
wi iv nnl .a! ivjii in llie first proceeding, even though 
such points might have been tendered and decided at 
that time. 
Commissioner n {iunnen< ;;;};$ 11.S yn , ',,4)7-98 (1948) (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). Gillmor is entitled to have a court determine 
whether any member of the public can access this property \ i: 1 r n 1 M I e u m 11 i n u n 1 
"highway-bv-11 s 1 " ( K. liini |» >; 111 | ;, I Inratisr t h.il is a different claim sounding 
in different law than the mere interpretation of a settlement agreement. 
Imposing res judicata in this situation would be contrary to establishes I Utah I 1 w : 
the Court "resolve[sj all doubls in bun <>(• i>rrmitluij.,) pari MV fu ha\e their day in 
court nil the merits of a controversy". BYL u. Fremco, 2005 UT 19, H28 (citation 
omitted), 110 P.3d 678. If there is any doubt whether res judicata exists here I he 
doubt should be resolved in Gillmoi s favor and lliis dispute "-ilioitld lie remanded 
to the histrii 1 Courl. . ... .- . • -
Hill u. Seattle First Natl Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992) also supports 
Gillmor's position. J^ • ... the parties were invols ed 111 aionlracl dispute A first 
at hun a a . bhuii/lit imi 1 um ludi d in! federal court regarding the co ntract 
between the parties and then a second action based on the same claims was 
brought in state court. 
Because 1 piiui federal court 
proceeding never fully explored the contractual 
relationship between Hill-Magnum *" Seattle 
13 
collateral estoppel does not prevent Hill-Mangum from 
relitigating the issue. Id. at 242 (emphasis added). * * * 
After the federal court's decision, Hill-Mangum 
brought the same claims against Seattle First in state 
court, alleging, inter alia, that Seattle First... breach[ed] 
an oral contract with Hill-Mangum. Id. at 244 
(emphasis added). * * * 
We agree that the federal court ruling bars any 
claim Hill-Magnum might base on the written 
agreement. However, to the extent that the trial court 
relied on collateral estoppel to bar an enquiry into the 
rights created by an oral agreement, it erred. Id. 
Both of the claims in Hill were based in contract yet this Court allowed the 
second case to proceed as to the oral contract because the first case only resolved 
the written contract. Similarly Gillmor should not be precluded from seeking 
public access to her property against all landowners that block her access through 
statutory claims that have never been brought or reached by any court. (R. 70-
ll\ 
B. Res judicata is inapplicable in this case because there was a change 
in the law. 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes "the general Rule that res judicata is 
no defense where between the time of the first judgment and the second there has 
14 
been an intervening decision or a change in the law creating an altered situation/' 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. I )uel, 324 U.S. 154,162 (1945) 
(emphasis added). 
There has been just such a change in the "highway-by-use"law, which 
allows Gillmor to bring her Complaint. (R, nut), p, .|"7 I 10 • p. 481. 25) The 
change in "highway-by-use" law supports Gillmor's request for access U» her 
propert^ A M . I ; . ^ . .. .-I . "[I]f the Court 
reads ^ ^ ase trilogy that came down just a month or so ago from the 
Supreme Court, it's clear that any Tom, Dick or Harry on the street has a riglil It 
bring a road-by-use case." (K, :>LM, \K ,IU II in 1 J Hits change in law precludes 
a luidingo! n\(« iiidituna mi the l)ighway-by-usen claim in Gillmor's Complaint. 
(R. 1-7). The change in "highway-by-use" law supports Gillmor's request for 
access to her property: 
The lack of clarity in this area of the law stems largely 
from the fact that we have never set forth a standard for 
determining what qualifies as a sufficient inicmipiion 
1o restart llic 1 iiiiniiij:1, ul' Ihc required ten-year period 
under the Dedication Statute MIO S*, i
 s< nv by setting 
forth a bright-line Rule i»> wi,,i;. 
J I . •, - e • -* c •• .n predictable: 
c dial io intended by a property owner ! 
interrupt the use of a road as a public thoroughfare, and 
15 
is reasonably calculated to do so, constitutes an 
interruption sufficient to restart the running of the 
required ten-year period under the Dedication Statute. 
Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008 UT10, H15 (emphasis added), 179 P.3d 768. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals decision against Gillmor in the 2001 case 
created just such an altered situation for Gillmor when it lessened the orivate 
access she believed she had. Until the Court of Appeals' decision, Gillmor did not 
have reason to believe that she and her children lacked meaningful access to the 
property, or that she would need to establish the existence of a public right of 
way. Therefore, res judicata does not bar her from bringing this Complaint. As 
stated by Gillmor's counsel, "[Gillmor's] position in the 2001 case was for rights 
about this big (demonstrating) and, when the Court of Appeals finished with it, 
the rights were maybe a teeny, tiny sliver of what Ms. Gillmor was arguing for. At 
that point, it's a pretty clear argument that the facts have ... materially changed." 
(R. 110, p. 351. 23 - p. 361. 4). 
In Gillmor's case both the facts and the law have changed. Therefore res 
judicata should not have been applied because courts should be careful about the 
preclusive effects of prior decisions, Zufelt v. Haste, Inc., 142 P.3d 594, 598 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2006), and this Court should remand the matter to the District Court 
decide the claims in Gillmor's Complaint. 
Condemnation is the other cause that Gillmor brings in the Complaint and, 
contrary to Family Links* position, condemnation could not have been argued in 
16 
.... ,^
 a j t e r n a i j , ( . { ,,, i in,, » ( i n | I, in,, | ( , i } \ ) | i ; , , > i j , , , , /\s noted by Gillmor's counsel, 
"[t]he need for condemning an access doesn' t arise unde r the condemnat ion 
statutes if you have access. That 's a sine qua non of condemnation, 11 nil i ( is, 
quote, necessary, dust1 nu nil i \K :>'M), p MI II ' i , ' | i 
GilhiK >r lian 1 no need to seek condemnat ion when she thought she had 
private access. However the interpretat ion of the 1984 agreement was ,.. 
Gillmor, in fact, did not have , i * ..-ton she 
broughl -i piililn titiiii I o i t ondemnat ion, a claim that , in fact, any member of the 
public, tha t meets the applicable requirements , is entitled to bring pursuant to 
U T A H C O D E A N N . §78B-6-50i( i)(e) . 
I I . Sanctions should not have been awarded because Rule nfb) (2) , UTAH. R 
Civ, P., was not violated. 
Rule 11 requires that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry »111 o 11 ni y: 11 i< I i f y 
of thea ' iHHi pnor In lilmj.1, ,i I 'ompl.nnl, whirl) (Jill run r's a t torney did. (R. 110, p . 24 
]! 9 and R. 229, p. 3211.12-19). 
[B]y present ing a pleading ... an a t torney ... is certifying 
lliiil lo tin In ,1 nil ihi1 person1 , hinvvliHii^t1, information, 
and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable u n d e r the 
circumstances, * * * (b)(2) the claims, defenses, and 
other legal contention.-* „„\hc\ wu ^ „ .-._ar 1 -ai 1 tea 
existing law or hy a nonfrivolous argument for the 
17 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or 
the establishment of new law. 
Rule 11, UTAH R. CIV. P. (emphasis added). 
If a Judge on the Court of Appeals of Utah agrees with the position of 
Gillmor's counsel, then how can that position be so unreasonable as to warrant 
sanctions under Rule 11, UTAH. R. Crv. P? As Judge Thorne stated in his dissent: 
Because I would reach a different conclusion on 
the issue of res judicata than the majority, it follows 
that Mrs. Gillmor's claim was asserted with a good faith 
argument against res judicata see UTAH. R. CIV. P. 
11(b)(2) (proving that rule 11 is violated when an 
attorney fails to make a reasonable inquiry to assure 
that 'the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions 
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 
argument for the extension, modification or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law'), is 
'objectively reasonable under all the circumstances,' 
Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah 1992), and 
should not result in rule 11(b) sanctions. Even if I am 
wrong and have erroneously applied the claim 
preclusion branch of res judicata, this is not enough to 
support a rule 11 violation. See id. C[T]he mere fact that 
18 
tlir .IIIMIKV* * i*1^ ol Hi*' law was ""wrong cannot support 
a finding of a rule 11 violation.') Accordingly, I would 
reverse the district court's decision concerning 
imposition of sanction.'-! 
GiZ/i/mr at H28. 
The majority decision of the Court of Appeals of Utah below fails J 
thiskeypoint Is Judge J hoi UP \ ', irv. 'imvasuiMbh m, its faro? Surt'. not. ±a 
such rhrumslances, sanctions under Rule n are not warranted. 
Rule 11(b)(2) was not violated. First, Gillmor's claims have not been 
brought in any other suit. Second, tlir claims am uairarttrtl by twisting law I h\ 
22<), p. ,$;> II. 1 10I, lunalls «(Jillint»r's claims are not "frivolous/' 
"Frivolous filings are 'those that are both baseless and made without a 
reasonable and competent inquiry.'" Estate of Blue o . • . 
F.3d982? i)Hit ojtli ("in on 1 (< it.ition uimiftnil llclore bringing this case, 
Gillmor's attorney did the research that Rule 11(b)(2) requires (See Gillmor at 
I28): 
[S]omt - !• - - • • , • - . i^d iiuiice 
pleading state, and I'm not going to tell you what the 
record will show if we get , , past this motion Because I 
knew .-•• • * . !;o tin question, 
when I filed the complaint, they sent a Rule 11 threat 
letter. They graciously backed off the Rule 11 threat letter, 
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but they made the motion nonetheless. And I understood 
it, anticipated it. I anticipated the arguments that were 
going to be made because they laid them out really clearly 
before, and I anticipated in advance. When I first raised 
this, there'd been a number of correspondence over the 
course of a couple of years before we got to this lawsuit, 
and we've had a full and frank discussion of these issues 
in the past to the point where they suggested I read the 
trial transcript in the last trial read every word of it, read 
everything that you could read about it so we understood 
what the case was about. (R. no , p. 231.18 - p. 241. 24) 
(emphasis added). 
Gillmor's counsel, after conducting research, determined there were reasonable 
basis to bring the claims, as in Barnard u. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229,1236 (Utah 
1992). "Rule 11 does not impose a duty to do perfect or exhaustive research. The 
appropriate standard is whether the research was objectively reasonable under all 
of the circumstances." Barnard at 1236. 
Just because Family Link and the District Court disagreed with Gillmor's 
position does not mean that Gillmor's counsel violated Rule 11 or that Family Link is 
entitled to sanctions. Rule 11 requires that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry 
into the validity of the action. There is no finding that Gillmor's counsel failed to 
investigate the claims asserted or that he failed to undertake appropriate legal 
r e s e a r c h pr ior I", l i l m g l l i e C o m p l a m l Ind iv id I h e D i s t o r t ("otirt d e t e r m i n e d t h a t 
b e c a u s e res judicata a p p l i e d , t h a t s a n c t i o n s m u s t loli< »w. a n d the C o u r t of Appea l s 
a g r e e d w i t h t h e Dis t r i c t Cour t , G i l lmor ' s a t t o r n n v In ucved tiuii *,.. . MJU-
( a n d a r e ) w a r r a n t , ii L>. * %; • •. -• - >^ n* * iv ton- wuMio t 
1
 loLlni Hi 11 < and k. 229, P- H2li. iii iy). 
The Court of Appeals of IIIal) cites ^c/?o?7Ci/r ^frrro/
 M,, hsiuL'S. I < . vo.j 
P.2d 59 (Utah * ! \pp. i o o ^ as supp< • . - • -
api !•-•:•• - * • * * .. !* 'iiannMsiLe. 
Unlike in Shoney, (hlhnor and her counsel did not merely "file a nrv 
Complaint containing the original claims . Shnneif a[ \ . -> -a: 
GiUmor ' s a t l o m e v r e s e a r c h e d • • -nr^otVpar*.: uid determined that 
Gillmor could assert claims on grounds independent • >1 eiain^ asserted in prior 
litigation. (R. 229, p. 221 23 • p. 23 I. 22). Hie Complaint asserted on v factual 
predicates lo the claims advanced, lach vvlm h were neither asserted nor entailed 
1 i* - :M)laint and were grounded in law Mch was not involved in ^M\ 
prior complaint. That the District Court and .1 man>nf\ ol tne i..m,; 1.; .ppeais 
iiliiuuiielydisagieed v\ .• -ffinetii loin\ol''' Ktil' 
"Rule 1 * '>-• >es not impose a duty to do perfect < w exhaustive research Tin 
appropriate standard N whether the research was ubjectively reasonable A-M< 
the circumstancesT ;w .- ,<>. 
The I, j'^ il Iheories in this case were iHo degrees 
apart from tlie legal theories in the last case, completely 
J\ 
and totally separate. The last case, the only one that Ms. 
Gillmor could possibly have binding against her because 
it's the only one she was the plaintiff in, in that case, she 
was arguing only on a contract. There was no argument 
about road-by-use ... I have a historian who spent thirty 
thousand bucks just to show this road's use since 1848. 
There is no question about good faith on the highway-by-
use claim.... And that's a completely new theory. (R. 229, 
p. 2311. 8 - 20). 
As we're driving over the road, Your Honor, I 
happened to notice, right next to the road sweetheart 
trees. And 'C.S. + M. K. = True Love, 1958.' ... And the 
statute says if it is used as a public road for a period often 
years, continuously as a public thoroughfare, then it 
becomes a public road and can only be closed by the local 
government. (R. 229, p. 2611.12-23). 
[T]he fact is that the legislature chose to determine 
whether it's a public purpose or not, and they said it's a 
public purpose ... a by-road leading from a highway or 
residence and farms, which must by definition of 
legislative construction, be something different than a 
city/county road. (R. 229, p. 6111. 2-13). 
Kven i( a dial n u n HUT I IIH is i haf ;i elami iy. not valid and subject to dismissal, 
Rule n sanctions do not ineluctably follow: "[W]e cannot sa\ that [counsel's | 
reading of the law, alone, supports the conclusion that nc , - ^ - , is* nai>le 
inqun\ linn die flaiins, defenses, ;mil nllier h%;il n)iile:;:;Mii& contained in the 
complaint." Hessv.uuiut^L^iy ±btsP.^747 " r j (UtahCt. \\)\y 2oo i . Rale 11 docs 
not apply unless no reasonable attorney would nave asserts* ^. .au.^ .: .:. L 
tlu umplamt *.. »vu-r\ .**--* .- » - . . . - - , 'hecidimsof 
ti ..'i'; JI,! ::i• • - - >: M ••: < v * i^  the 2004 lawsuit As that lawsuit concerned contract 
interpretation (which is what a dispute over a settlement involves) and dul not 
concern public rights, as were asserted m lliis ('omnlaml, it is nii-i In lIiii.L 1li.il >u 
reasonable lavn, er vvi xilil l»a\e filed I he Coi-pia±i±i. 
Unlike in Pemiimjton IK Allstate Insurance O» 973 P 2d 932, 93Q Ll.-il • 
1998), where the Court held that "pursuing an acts-
im:-M-=M;-U .. • * .--.,r.. .,.>..*:. a a n>e> to exceed the PIP cap is an 
nm V:«P*M- purpose", no Utah Court has held thai persuing an action that'~ later 
1M!;:)I1 P.- he hinredby res judicata \> improper for the purpose ^ M * : 
CONCLUSION 
Gillmor's action was not barred by res iitdwtita and Rule* 11( b II:' I", 11 IAH 
'; was no 1 iitted and saint lions should no! have been awarded. The 
^ .,. >. - M it- t of Utah should adopt the decision t »f the dissent ol the Utah Court 
of Appeals, and return the case to the District Cour t for further proceedings on 
23 
the substance a I Hil1". "" ' ' mipl.iml, 
DATKI) this / .? ' ^ day of July, 2010. 
Bruce B. Baird 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20080757-CA 
F I L E D 
( J a n u a r y 14 , 2 010) 
2010 UT App 2 
Third District, Silver Summit Department, 070500385 
The Honorable Robert K. Hilder 
Attorneys: Bruce R. Baird and Dallis A. Nordstrom, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant and Cross-appellee 
Keith W. Meade, Elizabeth T. Dunning, and Edwin C, 
Barnes, Salt Lake City, for Appellees and Cross-
appellants 
Before Judges Thorne, Bench, and Greenwood.1 
BENCH, Senior Judge: 
Ifl Plaintiff Nadine Gillmor (Mrs. Gillmor) appeals the district 
court's dismissal of her claims on res judicata grounds and 
imposition of sanctions against her attorney under rule 11(b)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for filing a claim without 
basis in law. Defendants cross-appeal the district court's 
1. Judges Russell W. Bench and Pamela T. Greenwood heard and 
voted on this case as regular members of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. They both retired from the court on January 1, 2010, 
before this decision issued. Hence, they are designated herein 
as Senior Judges. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-103(2) (2008); Sup. 
Ct. R. of Prof'l Practice 11-201(6). 
denial of sanctions under rule i 
improp° r purpose W^ a f f irm.z 
BACKGROUND 
f2 In 1984, Mrs. Gillmor's :IL,M^:JU. U.HU.C: . . ai^. o-
(Mr. Gillmor)f brought suit against David K. Richards. M± * 
Gillmor sought a prescriptive easement or irrevocable license in 
an attempt to access h is property (the Gillmor property) by way 
of two private roads, which run from a nearby highway and through 
Richards's property (the Richards property). The parties settled 
the 1984 suit by entering into an Easement and Use Agreement (the 
easement agreement). Following the settlement, upon the parties' 
joint stipulation, the district court dismissed with preiudiee 
the 19 84 suit on the merits, 
113 In 2001,- Mrs. Gillmor filed suit against the subsequent 
owners of the Richards property, seeking a declaration of her 
rights under the easement agreement.3 Specifically, the 2001 
suit concerned the authorized use of the roads to access the 
Gillmor property under the easement agreement. The district 
court's decision was appealed, and in Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT 
App 351, 121 P.3d 57, this court concluded that the easement 
agreement grants a personal easement to a limited class of 
people, including Mrs. Gillmor. See id. 4 * 15-2 3. We expressly 
held that Mrs. Gillmor's personal right to access the Gillmor 
property through the Richards property does not expand the rights 
of any other person to use the easements or the purposes for 
which the easements may be used beyond what is expressly 
authorized by the easement agreement. See id. iff 14, 23, < 
Further, this court concluded that those uses expressly 
authorized by the easement agreement, which would run with the 
property, were limited to very narrow and specific purposes. See 
xu. ft 24-31. Consequently, use of the easements for purposes 
other than Mrs. Gillmor's own access was severely I imi ted by the 
easement agreement. See id. Iff 14, 23, 43. 
oecdus'-: we o^:u::-ide that Mrs. Gilliiioi ' s claims are barred by 
res judicata, we i :ot address Defendants' alternative argument 
that her c.^-mr a^ .-; 1 .so barred by indicia" p^-nnoe], 
3. Following the 1995 passing of Mr. Gillmor, Mrs. Gillmor 
became the owner of the Gillmor property. After the 1984 sui t, 
the Richards property was partitioned and sold to other persons 
who were named as parties in the 2 001 suit and the present suit. 
For the reader's convenience, we refer to these parcel s 
col ] ectively as the Richards property. 
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114 In 2007, Mrs. Gillmor filed the present suit against 
Defendants, owners of the Richards property, pleading 
condemnation and "highway-by-public-use." See generally Utah 
Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2009) (permitting a highway to be dedicated 
to public use when "continuously used as a public thoroughfare 
for a period of ten years"). Like the 1984 and 2001 suits, this 
suit concerns use of the roads over the Richards property to 
access the Gillmor property. But this time a public right has 
been asserted, rather than a private right arising out of 
contract or property ownership. Defendants moved the district 
court to dismiss, arguing that Mrs. Gillmor's claims are barred 
by res judicata. 
%5 Before the district court, both parties' arguments focused 
solely on whether, under the claim preclusion branch of res 
judicata, Mrs. Gillmor's claims could and should have been 
brought in either of the two prior suits. Mrs. Gillmor*s 
attorney, Bruce R. Baird, asserted that Mrs. Gillmor's claims 
were subject to "narrow exceptions" to res judicata, arguing that 
"'there are cases in which the doctrine of res judicata must give 
way to . . . overriding concerns of public policy and simple 
justice.'" (Quoting Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 
U.S. 394, 402-03 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (responding by 
separate concurrence to the lead opinion's rejection of an 
equitable exception to res judicata, see id. at 401, arguing that 
the majority should not "close the door" to such an exception).) 
Mr. Baird did not cite to any specific examples of exceptions to 
res judicata. Rather, Mr. Baird argued that Mrs. Gillmor should 
be permitted to pursue these legal theories, regardless of the 
two prior suits, because the theories alleged are public rights 
that can "be brought by other members of the public." Mr. Baird 
supported his argument only by referencing the policies behind 
res judicata, arguing that these policies would not be 
compromised by allowing Mrs. Gillmor to pursue her present suit 
because "the claims brought by [Mrs. Gillmor] are claims which 
can be brought by other members of the public . . . so judicial 
economy and multiple law suits should not be implicated simply 
because of the identity of the Plaintiff." To emphasize his 
point that any member of the public could allege these legal 
theories, Mr. Baird stated, "[I]f the Court dismisses [Mrs. 
Gillmor's claims,] I'll bring [the same causes of action] in 
somebody else's name." 
If6 Mr. Baird conceded that the legal theories alleged here 
could have been brought in either the 1984 or 2001 suits, as they 
were legally and factually available at those times. Mr. Baird 
also speculated that these theories were omitted from earlier 
suits for strategic purposes, stating that simultaneously 
bringing a claim for a public and private right of access "would 
have been pretty dicey." 
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11 / Following oral argument, the district cour t i uled £i om the 
bench that Mrs. Gillmor's claims were barred by res judicata. 
The district court relied upon the preclusive effect of both the 
1984 and 2001 suits. The district court found that the legal 
theories presented had been "legally and factually available for 
many decades" and reasoned that the three suits involved the same 
claim because each was motivated by a common goal—access to the 
Gillmor property. Accordingly, the district court concluded that 
these claims could and should have been presented in the prior 
suits. The district court also stated, without objection from 
either party. "There's no question about any of the other prongs 
of claim preclusion applying here." 
K8 Deferiucs..^. ;.:ie: ,<-vt-w ror sanctions under rule 11(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court imposed rule 
11(b)(2) sanctions against Mr. Baird for filing a claim without 
basis in law because Mrs. Gillmor's claims were barred by res 
judicata. However, the district court declined to impose 
sanctions under rule 11(b)(1) for filing a claim with an improper 
purpose, finding no evidence that either Mrs. Gillmor or Mr, 
Baird acted with an i mproper purpose. Mrs. Gillmor appeals, nicl 
Defendants cross-appeal. 
ISSUES ANU STANUAKDI-I c,,i. HFV1FW 
Mrs. Gillmor first appeals the district court's 
determination that her claims are barred by the claim preclusion 
branch of res judicata. "Whether res judicata, and more 
specifical] y claim preclusion, bars an action presents a question 
of law that we review for correctness." Mack v. Utah State Dep't 
of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, II 26, 635 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
110 Mrs. Gillmor also appeals the district court's decision to 
impose sanctions against her attorney, Mr. Baird, under rule 
11(b)(2) for filing a claim without basis in law. Defendants 
cross-appeal the district court's decision not to impose 
sanctions against both Mrs. Gillmor and Mr. Baird under rule 
11(b)(1) for filing a claim with an improper purpose. "In 
reviewing a trial court's imposition of [rule 11] sanctions, 
we first review the trial court's factual findings under 
the clearly erroneous' standard. We then review the trial 
court's legal conclusions for correctness. Finally, we review 
the type and amount of sanctions imposed under the abuse of 
discretion standard." Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 
932, 936-37 (Utah 1998) (quoting Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 
1229, 1234-35 (Utah 1992)). The decision of whether to actually 
impose sanctions is ultimately within the district court's 
discretion. See Utah R. Civ."P. 11(c) ("If . . . the court 
determines that subd i vision (b) has been violated, the court 
0 0B0 7S 7- \'f\ 4 
may . . . impose an appropriate sanction . . . ." (emphasis 
added)); Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 2001 UT 8, H 34, 20 P.3d 
307 ("[I]t remains within the court's discretion to apply 
sanctions under rule 11(c) even if it finds a violation of rule 
11(b) . . . . " ) . 
Decisions regarding rule 11 sanctions 
are best left in the hands of the trial 
court. We therefore accord reasonable 
discretion to the trial court to determine 
when sanctions are useful and appropriate. 
When applying the appropriate standards of 
review, we grant considerable deference to 
the trial court's factual findings and some 
deference to the trial court's application of 
the facts when reaching its legal conclusion 
of whether rule 11 has been violated. We 
also afford substantial deference to the 
trial court's ultimate determination of when, 
and to what extent, sanctions are a useful 
tool in controlling abuses of the judicial 
process. 
Archuleta v. Galetka, 2008 UT 76, f 7, 197 P.3d 650. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Res Judicata 
IF 11 Mrs. Gillmor first argues that the district court 
erroneously concluded that her claims are barred by the claim 
preclusion branch of res judicata. "Claim preclusion is premised 
on the principle that a controversy should be adjudicated only 
once," Mack v. Utah State Dep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, f 29, 
635 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (internal quotation marks omitted), and 
"reflects the expectation that parties who are given the capacity 
to present their entire controversies shall in fact do so," 
American Estate Mqmt. Corp. v. International Inv. & Dev. Corp., 
1999 UT App 232, U 12, 986 P.2d 765 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Whether claim preclusion bars the relitigation of 
certain claims depends upon full satisfaction of a three-part 
test: 
First, both cases must involve the same 
parties or their privies. Second, the claim 
that is alleged to be barred must have been 
presented in the first suit or be one that 
could and should have been raised in the 
first action. Third, the first suit must 
have resulted in a final judgment on the 
merits. 
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Mack, 2009 UT 47, 11 29 (internal quotation marKs omitted) 
Because the parties below contested only the second prong of 
claim preclusion, our analysis will focus on whether the claims 
at issue in this case could and should have been brought in 
either the 1984 or 2001 suits.4 
H12 "A claim or cause of action io ,.^  aggregate of operative 
facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts," 
Id. 11 30 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Claims or causes 
of action are the same as those brought or that could have been 
brought in the first action if they arise from the same operati ve 
facts, or jr. other words from the same transaction." Id^ 
(citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982) jT ~ "What 
factual grouping constitutes a "transaction,1 . . . [is] to 
be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations 
as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or 
motivation[ and] whether they form a convenient trial unit 
•1 neither party has ever contested that both the !9o4 -. no < 
suits resulted in a final judgment on the merits. And be^ow, 
neither party challenged whether the parties here are either T ae 
same parties as or are in privity with the parties from the r---
prior suits. At oral argument before this court, Mr. Baird 
asserted for the first time that Mrs. Gillmor is not in privi -y 
with her husband, Mr Gillmor. Because this argument wa:% no-
proper ly preserved, we will not address it. See Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(5)(A) (requiring a party to show that the issue being 
appealed was preserved in the trial oou-*!.); Badger v. Brooklyn 
Canal C o . , 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (explaining preservation 
requirement and stating that n[i]ssues not raised at trial are 
usually deemed waiv e d " ) ; State v. Marble, 2 007 UT App 82, If 19, 
". • ' t . 3d ?•"! {decline:; to review o- appea"- an I ssue rai sed for 
t i} e f . r st r • *- * * »r~ n" ime n t) , 
In Mack v. Utah State Department of Commerce, 2 009 UT 4 7, 635 
Utah Adv. Rep. 79, the Utah Supreme Court expressly adopted the 
transactional theory as articulated in the Restatement (Second) 
of Judgments § 24 (1982), concerning the same claim elemerr -•£ 
claim preclusion: 
Previously we have held that two causes of 
action are the same if they rest on the same 
'state of facts,' and the evidence 'necessary 
to sustain the two causes of action' is of 
the same kind or character. Schaer v. State, 
657 P. 2d 1337, 1340 (Utah 1983). More 
recently, however, we have moved toward the 
trans actiona1 theory o^ ^"aim preclus A on 
ispoused by nh^ Restatement , "ero: d 
1U. 
<~^A 6 
. . . ." Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2). See 
generally id. § 24 cmt. b (explaining what constitutes a 
transaction). Accordingly, "res judicata . . . turn[s] on the 
essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the 
various legal claims," Mack, 2009 UT 47, If 30 (internal 
quotation marks omitted), or a common motivation behind those 
claims, see Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24(2), "[r]ather 
than resting on the specific legal theory invoked," Mack, 2009 UT 
47, 1 30 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). "Defining the scope of a claim or cause of action is 
not an exact science and, in fact, is at times driven by the 
relative importance of the finality of judgment. When, as in 
this case, . . . real property is at issue, the need for finality 
is at its apex." American, 1999 UT App 232, 11 10 (citations 
omitted). 
113 Although Mrs. Gillmor has alleged different legal theories 
in the present suit, we conclude that these theories "could and 
should have been raised" in either the 1984 or 2001 suits. See 
Mack, 2009 UT 47, 1f 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). All 
three suits have had an identical motivation calculated to obtain 
a common goal: use of roads over the Richards property in order 
to more easily access the Gillmor property. Therefore, each suit 
has asserted the same claim. Further, Mrs. Gillmor has conceded 
that the legal theories at issue here were legally and factually 
available before the 1984 suit and, therefore, could have been 
pleaded in either of the two prior suits. 
1114 It appears that a claim based on public rights may have been 
intentionally ignored or strategically sacrificed in favor of 
asserting a private right. When the district court inquired why 
Mrs. Gillmor had not asserted public rights before, Mr. Baird 
speculated that omitting these theories may have been a strategic 
decision, stating that simultaneously asserting a public and 
private right to access "would have been pretty dicey." The 
district court then characterized Mrs. Gillmor's present suit as 
being a last resort to gain access in response to the less-than-
favorable result of the 2001 suit: "[Mrs. Gillmor] argues that 
her present legal causes of action were utterly unnecessary until 
the Court of Appeals ruled against her, but that argument only 
suggests that litigation choices were made, as they should be, 
and not every possible theory was advanced." Further, the record 
indicates that the Gillmors sought a private right to access the 
Gillmor property over the Richards property, to the exclusion of 
a public thoroughfare, and that Mrs. Gillmor would prefer that 
the roads remain private. This is not only a strategic decision 
on how to present the claim, but it is also a choice as to the 
desired objective of the litigation. Whether "purposely or 
negligently," the Gillmors failed to assert all available 
theories supporting their claim "by all proper means within 
[their] control." See American, 1999 UT App 232, 11 12 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). They cannot "be permitted to . . . 
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relitigate the same matters betwet ue same ^cu-L^e^," See id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted) Nor may they now "pursue 
their claim , , . through piecemeal litigation, [having offered] 
one legal theory to the courr while holding others in reserve for 
future litigation," which are now being asserted because the 
first two suits have "prove Fn; unsuccessful." See id. 1" 14. 
Mrs. Gillmor cannot now be allowed yet anotner "attempt at 
substantially the same objective undei a different guise." See 
Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 4T>, 376 P.2d 946, 948 (1962).— 
Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that Mrs. 
Gi ] lmor's c] a ims are barred by res judicata. 
1115 Both parties challenge the district t;ou:t j decision 
concerning the imposition of ra^M.ons. Pj ' •" * 1 ' b ) states in 
pertinent part, 
(b) By presenting a pleading, writte:. mo-:on, 
or other paper to the court (whether ny 
signing, filing, submitting, or advocati:.\\ ,< 
an attorney or unrepresented party is 
certifying that to the best of the person .:: 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed 
after an inquiry re^^nah"^ \ mder the 
circumstances, 
^2) it is not being presented for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless i ncrease 
i n the cost of ] itigati on; [and] 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal 
contentions are warranted by existing law or 
by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, 
mod ification, or reversal of existing 3 aw or 
the estab] i shment of new law[,] 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)~(2). Each subpar t of i ule l^i.) 
provides a separate basis for sanctionable conduct that must be 
independently met. See id. R. 11(c); Crank v. Utah Judicial 
Council, 2001 UT 8, 11 33, 20 P. 3d 307. We emphasize that 
" [d]ecisions regarding rule l j. ^ unctions are best left in the 
hands of the trial court. !" Archuleta v. Galetka, 2008 UT 76, 
1" 7, 197 P. 3d 650. We therefore "afford substantial deference to 
the trial court's ultimate determination of when, and to what 
extent, sanctions are a usefi i] tool i n controlling abuses of the 
j udic i a 1 process." ' cL_ 
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A. Rule 11(b)(2) 
1116 Mrs. Gillmor argues that the district court improperly 
imposed sanctions against Mr. Baird for violating rule 11(b)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure by filing a claim that is 
not "warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 
[a change in] . . . existing law." See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). 
See generally id. R. 11(c)(2)(A) (stating that although sanctions 
may be imposed against attorneys or parties, sanctions may not be 
imposed against a represented party for violation of subsection 
11(b)(2)). Whether a claim is warranted by existing law or by a 
nonfrivolous argument for the change in existing law is not 
determined by whether the argument is the correct legal position 
but by whether it is "objectively reasonable under all the 
circumstances." Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 
1992). Here, the district court's determination that Mr. Baird 
had violated rule 11(b)(2) was premised upon the court's 
conclusion that Mrs. Gillmor's claims were barred by res 
judicata. See generally Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 
P.2d 59, 62 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (affirming trial court's 
imposition of rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff who attempted 
to relitigate identical claims that were clearly barred by res 
judicata). In view of our conclusion that Mrs. Gillmor's claims 
are barred by res judicata, the appropriate standard of review is 
whether the district court's decision to impose sanctions was an 
abuse of its discretion. See Archuleta, 2008 UT 76, If 7. 
1117 The district court began its rule 11(b)(2) analysis by 
concluding that Mrs. Gillmor!s claims were barred by res 
judicata: neither party had contested the privity and finality 
elements; and the present suit involved the same claim as the 
1984 and 2001 suits because each suit claimed access to the 
Gillmor property based on facts and legal theories that had been 
available at those times. The district court wrote that it was 
"at a loss to understand how plaintiff could have brought the 
present action without violating [r]ule 11(b)(2) [because] once 
the three elements [of res judicata] are satisfied, [it was] 
unaware of any exceptions to application of the bar imposed by 
res judicata, and plaintiff has not identified any such 
exception." (Emphasis added.) 
1118 The district court's finding that Mr. Baird did not present 
any legal authority in support of the purported exceptions to res 
judicata is particularly persuasive. Mr. Baird argues that "the 
mere fact that [his] view of the law was wrong cannot support a 
finding of a rule 11 violation." See generally Barnard, 846 P.2d 
at 1236. However, it is not that Mr. Baird's arguments below 
were wrong but that those arguments were not supported by any 
legal authority—especially given the fact that Mr. Baird had 
anticipated the res judicata issue before filing this suit. In 
light of the filing of a claim barred by res judicata and the 
absence of any legal authority in support of Mr. Baird's 
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arguments below concerning exceptions to res judicata, we cannot 
say that the district court abused its considerable discretion in 
imposing sanctions against Mr. Baird for violating rule 11(b)(2). 
B. Rule 11(b)(1) 
If 19 Defendants argue on cross-appeal that the district court 
improperly denied their motion for sanctions against both Mrs. 
Gillmor and Mr. Baird under rule 11(b)(1) for filing a claim with 
an improper purpose. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). See 
generally id. R. 11(c) (allowing sanctions to be imposed against 
attorneys and parties). Whether a party acted with an improper 
purpose is a question of fact, reviewed under the clearly 
erroneous standard. See Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 
P.2d 932, 937 (Utah 1998) (characterizing a party's purpose under 
rule 11(b)(1) as an issue of intent, which is a question of fact 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard); Edwards v. Powder 
Mountain Water & Sewer, 2009 UT App 185, 1F 25, 214 P.3d 120 ("We 
must uphold a trial court's factual findings regarding whether 
rule 11 has been violated unless the evidence clearly weighs 
against such findings."). "A factual finding is deemed clearly 
erroneous only if it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence," and "we will not overturn a trial court's factual 
findings if its account of the evidence is plausible in light of 
the record viewed in its entirety." Pennington, 973 P.2d at 937 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
H20 In denying Defendants' request to impose sanctions against 
Mrs. Gillmor and Mr. Baird for violating rule 11(b)(1), the 
district court wrote that it could "see no evidence of a purpose 
to harass, delay, . . . impose unnecessary cost[,] . . . or 
needlessly increase the costs of litigation." Rather, the 
district court stated that Mrs. Gillmor's purpose was clear: "to 
obtain access that has not been obtained through previously 
advanced theories." After reviewing the record, we cannot say 
that the district court's findings are against the clear weight 
of the evidence. We, therefore, will not disturb the district 
court's decision not to impose sanctions against Mrs. Gillmor and 
Mr. Baird for violating rule 11(b)(1). 
CONCLUSION 
1f21 The district court correctly concluded that Mrs. Gillmor's 
claims are barred by res judicata. All three suits brought by 
the Gillmors have asserted the same claim: use of the roads over 
the Richards property to more easily access the Gillmor property. 
And the theories alleged here were legally and factually 
available when the first suit was filed. Therefore, these 
theories could and should have been raised in one of the prior 
suits. The district court acted within its discretion in 
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imposing sanctions against Mr. Baird for violating rule 11(b)(2) 
and denying sanctions under rule 11(b)(1). 
1122 Accordingly, we affirm.6 
Russell W. Bench, Senior Judge 
1123 I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Senior Judge 
THORNE, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part): 
H24 I concur in the general statement of the law of res judicata 
and rule 11 sanctions as set out in the majority opinion but 
dissent from application thereof to the instant case. I disagree 
with the majority's conclusion that each of the three actions 
asserted sufficiently similar claims, see supra 11 13, and, that, 
therefore, the third action is barred by the claim preclusion 
branch of res judicata. The suits initiated in 1984 and 2001 
were private claims, the first for a prescriptive easement or 
irrevocable license and the second for a declaration of rights 
under the easement agreement negotiated in the previous case. 
These private claims are different than and may be pursued 
separately from the public interest claim under Utah Code section 
72-5-104 (the Dedication Statute) as initiated in the present 
suit. See Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104 (2009). 
1125 Although the public interest claim could have been presented 
in either the 1984 or 2001 suit, I do not believe that it should 
necessarily have been raised in the previous actions for several 
reasons. First, neither Mr. Gillmor in his 1984 action nor Mrs. 
Gillmor in her 2001 action were obligated to bring a public 
claim—seeking a right for the members of the public to use the 
6. We do not address Defendants' request for attorney fees under 
rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because it was 
inadequately briefed. See generally Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 
P.2d 305, 313 ("[A]n appellate court will decline to consider an 
argument that a party has failed to adequately brief."). 
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Richards property—in their pursuit of a determination of their 
own private right to use of the property. Indeed, the Gillmors' 
decision not to pursue a public claim under the Dedication 
Statute ought not preclude any member of the general public from 
initiating such a suit at a later time. The objective of claim 
preclusion is "that a controversy should be adjudicated only 
once/' see Mack v. Utah State^Pep't of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, 
11 29, 635 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
This, however, is not feasible in the present case where members 
of the public may still pursue a public claim regardless of prior 
private right litigation. 
12 6 Application of claim preclusion to this matter would lead to 
an illogical result. A literal application of claim preclusion 
in the present case would have the effect of preventing all 
members of the public from bringing a public claim based on the 
res judicata ruling barring the Gillmors from pursuing such a 
public claim. Even if claim preclusion were applied only to the 
Gillmors, the majority's decision today would be illogical in 
that it would prevent the Gillmors from pursuing a claim which 
any other member of the public might bring seeking the 
declaration of a public right in this piece of property. Instead 
of ending a dispute about the rights pertaining to a parcel, the 
majority decision simply delays the resolution for another day. 
1127 Second, the private claims asserted in the 1984 and 2001 
actions are inherently different and require the presence of 
different factual determinations than the present public claim 
under the Dedication Statute.7 As such, I would reverse the 
district court's dismissal of Mrs. Gillmor's public claim on res 
judicata grounds. 
t28 Because I would reach a different conclusion on the issue of 
res judicata than the majority, it follows that Mrs. Gillmor's 
claim was asserted with a good faith argument against res 
judicata, see Utah R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2) (providing that rule 11 is 
7. The 1984 action asserted a claim for prescriptive easement. 
To establish a prescriptive easement, a claimant "must establish 
a use that is open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for at 
least twenty years." Edqell v. Canning, 1999 UT 21, It 8, 976 
P. 2d 1193. The 2001 action sought a declaration of rights under 
the easement agreement negotiated in the previous case. Neither 
of these two causes of action require, as does the present claim, 
proof that the property has been continuously used by the public 
a s a
 public thoroughfare. See Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding 
Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, H 10, 208 P.3d 1077, cert, denied, 
215 P.3d 161 (Utah 2009). "To satisfy the public thoroughfare 
element, [p]laintiffs must demonstrate proof of (i) passing or 
travel, (ii) by the public, and (iii) without permission." Id. 
It 11. 
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violated when an attorney fails to make a reasonable inquiry to 
assure that "the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions 
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the 
establishment of new law"), is "objectively reasonable under all 
the circumstances," Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah 
1992), and should not result in rule 11(b) sanctions. Even if I 
am wrong and have erroneously applied the claim preclusion branch 
of res judicata, this is not enough to support a rule 11 
violation. See id. ("[T]he mere fact that the attorney's view of 
the law was wrong cannot support a finding of a rule 11 
violation."). Accordingly, I would reverse the district court's 
decision concerning the imposition of sanctions. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
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